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1 INTRODUCTION  
The twelve states1 that entered the European Union (EU) in 2004 achieved considerable 
macroeconomic stabilization during the accession process. The Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries among them went through the transition from central 
planning to market economies, beginning with severe recessions, high inflation, and 
financial instability. In due course, the inflation rates came down and nominal interest 
rates declined. Public debt has been stabilized, though high and persistent deficits and 
the need for further fiscal adjustments are still critical issues in several cases. 
In the years to come, the new EU member states will face two principal challenges in 
formulating macroeconomic policies. The first is to manage the continued and likely 
rapid process of further real economic convergence, which will come with high real 
GDP and productivity growth rates and large capital inflows. The second is to achieve 
the degree of nominal convergence required to enter into (the Third Stage of) European 
Monetary Union (EMU). These two challenges are not unrelated, as rapid growth and 
large capital inflows can make it more difficult to achieve nominal convergence, 
although, as we have argued in a recent paper (von Hagen and Traistaru-Siedschlag, 
2006), there are good reasons to believe that real convergence would be easier to 
manage for some of the countries at least, if they were allowed to adopt the euro 
immediately. Both challenges relate mainly to fiscal policy: Managing capital inflows, 
because fiscal policy can absorb part of their demand effects; and nominal convergence, 
because the sustainability of public finances is part of the requirement for entering 
EMU.  
Lifting capital controls and restrictions on foreign currency trade was one of the 
conditions these states had to meet to qualify for EU membership. Thus, the CEE 
countries went from being largely closed to being largely open to international capital 
flows. This paper discusses their experience with capital account liberalization and with 
coping with large capital inflows. We begin in Section 2 with a discussion of basic 
economic characteristics and the real convergence achieved so far. In Section 3, we 
discuss the pace and sequencing of capital account liberalization and the degree of 
                                                 
1 Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.   
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international financial integration achieved so far. Given the different initial conditions 
and economic characteristics of Cyprus and Malta, we focus on the CEE group. Further, 
in Section 4 we analyse trends and patterns of capital inflows in these countries in 
recent years. Some stylized facts are useful for understanding the macroeconomic 
implications and policy challenges of coping with large capital inflows discussed in 
Section 5. Finally we conclude in Section 6 with policy implications for emerging Asian 
countries.  
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2. BASIC ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND REAL 
CONVERGENCE 
The ten CEE countries are small open economies.2 As a group they amount to about 21 
percent of the EU-27 population and 11 percent of the EU-27 total GDP in Purchasing 
Power Standards (PPS). Figure 1 shows that the smallest among them (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria) are comparable in economic size to 
Luxembourg; while the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania are similar in size to 
Ireland, and Poland is similar to the Netherlands. By European standards, Luxembourg, 
Ireland, and the Netherlands are also small open economies.  
Trade openness, measured as total exports and imports of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP is close to the trade openness of the Euro area in Romania and 
Poland and much higher in the rest of the CEE countries; see Figure 2. 
 
Figure 1: GDP in PPS (% EU-27), 2006 
 
Source: Based on the AMECO Database, European Commission 
                                                 
2  The CEE countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. We do not include Cyprus and Malta in this paper because their 
underlying economic characteristics are different from the transition economies.  
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Figure 2: Trade Openness (Trade % of GDP), 2006  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AMECO Database, European Commission. 
 
In 2006, the gross fixed capital formation as percent of GDP ranged from 21.9 percent 
in Hungary to over 25.0 percent in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria 
and over 30.0 percent in Estonia and Latvia (Figure 3). 
  
Figure 3: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP), 2006  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AMECO Database, European Commission. 
 
These investment rates are high compared to the Euro-area average of 21.1 percent. 
Given the low levels of per capita income in these countries, investment rates are 
expected to remain high in the foreseeable future.  
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Over the past decade, the CEE countries experienced a strong process of real 
convergence to the EU in terms of real GDP per capita and productivity levels. As 
shown in Figure 4, they grew at much higher rates than the Euro area. The group’s 
average real GDP growth rate was 3.6 percent during 1997-2001, and 5.4 percent during 
2002-2006, while the Euro area grew at 2.8 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. The 
three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) experienced the highest growth rates 
over the past decade. Average annual growth rates were 6.2 percent in Estonia and 
Latvia and 5.0 percent in Lithuania during 1997-2001, and climbed to 9.0 percent in 
Estonia and Latvia and 8.0 percent in Lithuania during 2002-2006. Significantly, over 
the past five years, real growth remained vigorous in the CEE countries even though 
growth in the Euro area slowed down.  
 
Figure 4: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1997-2006 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2007. 
 
Figure 5 shows a significant negative correlation between the level of GDP per capita in 
1997 and the average annual growth rates over 1997-2006, as countries with low initial 
per capita income levels grew faster than richer countries. The three Baltic countries, as 
well as Bulgaria and Romania, which have the lowest levels of per capita income, are 
expected to continue to post the highest growth rates among the EU countries.  
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Figure 5: Convergence of Real GDP per Capita, 1997-2006  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AMECO Database, European Commission. 
 
Over the past decade, labor productivity growth, measured as the increase in real GDP 
per person employed, has been much higher in EU-10 in comparison with the Euro area. 
The highest growth rates were again in the three Baltic countries (Figure 6). There is a 
clear tendency for productivity levels to converge as countries with low initial levels of 
productivity enjoyed higher growth rates in comparison to countries with higher levels 
and the Euro area (Figure 7). 
Figure 6: Labor Productivity Growth, 1997-2006 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2007. 
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Figure 7: Convergence of Labor Productivity Levels, 1997-2006 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AMECO Database, European Commission. 
  
3. CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
    FINANCIAL INTEGRATION   
In this section we present an overview of the pace and sequencing of capital account 
liberalization in the ten CEE countries before their accession to the European Union and 
analyse the degree of their international financial integration3 to date.  
At the beginning of the transition to market economies, all ten CEE countries had closed 
capital accounts. Capital account liberalization was part of their integration into the 
world economy. However, the pace was country-specific reflecting different initial 
conditions and macroeconomic development. 4  As a first step, current account 
convertibility was achieved between 1994 and 1996 as part of IMF membership 
obligations.5 For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic, the 
application for OECD membership in 1993-1994 was an additional catalyst for capital 
                                                 
3 Throughout this paper the terms “international financial integration”, “capital account liberalization” 
and “financial openness” are used interchangeably.  
4 Arvay (2005) discusses in details the capital account liberalization in eight of the new EU member states 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). 
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account liberalization. But most importantly, the prospect of EU membership and the 
accession negotiations provided an institutional anchor for capital account liberalization 
in all CEE countries. Since the free movement of capital among member states and 
between member states and third countries is part of the EC Treaty, 6 EU accession 
required full capital account liberalization. A schedule of steps for capital account 
liberalization was negotiated between each CEE country and the European Commission. 
Deviations from this schedule were allowed only in circumstances that had the potential 
to undermine the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies. Transitional 
arrangements allowing some restrictions to be maintained beyond the entry into the EU 
were implemented for all CEE countries mostly with respect to politically sensitive 
areas such as the acquisition of agricultural and forestry land and real estate.  
Regarding the pace of capital account liberalization, we can distinguish two groups of 
countries. First, the Baltic countries and the Czech Republic had abolished most 
restrictions on capital transactions by 1995. In contrast, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, and Slovenia opened their capital accounts more gradually, achieving full 
liberalization in 2001-2004. We include Bulgaria and Romania in this latter group, as 
they joined the EU only in 2007.  
Table A1 in the Appendix summarises the experience of the CEE countries with capital 
account liberalization and managing large capital inflows. Three common features can 
be identified: (i) Restrictions on FDI were removed before portfolio flows were 
liberalised; (ii) Capital inflows were liberalised before capital outflows; and (iii) Long-
term capital flows were liberalised before short-term flows.  
The traditional approach for assessing capital account openness is to look at legal 
restrictions on cross-border capital flows (de jure measures). There are more than 60 
measures that can be grouped into direct (administrative) and indirect (market-based) 
restrictions. The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER) provides pertinent information. It has been used to construct 
quantitative measures of capital account openness ranging from binary measures (0/1 
dummy variables) (Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995) to more sophisticated indices of 
financial openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006; Miniane, 2004; Mody and Murshid, 2005; 
                                                 
6 The relevant provisions are under Articles 56 EC to 60 EC.   
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Quinn, 2003). Table A2 in the Appendix reports the capital controls in place at the end 
of 2006 in the ten CEE countries. The number of controls on capital transactions ranges 
from two in Romania to 11 in Poland. All ten countries maintain controls for real estate 
transactions, and with the exception of Hungary, all have specific provisions with 
respect to commercial banks and institutional investors.7  
However, these de jure measures have several shortcomings that may prevent them 
from accurately capturing the extent of capital account openness (Kose et al., 2006). 
First, the AREAER information is related to foreign exchange restrictions, which do not 
necessarily limit capital flows. Second, they do not reflect the enforcement of capital 
controls nor their effectiveness. Finally, other financial regulations, such as prudential 
caps on the foreign-exchange exposure of domestic banks, restrict capital flows in 
practice, but they are not counted as capital controls.  
An alternative approach to measuring capital account openness is to use de facto 
measures that reflect international financial integration (see for example Prasad, et al, 
2003; Kose et al, 2006; Lane and Milesi - Ferretti, 2006). Such measures are based on 
actual capital flows and more accurately reflect the capital account openness in practice. 
To illustrate the extent of capital account liberalization in the CEE countries, we analyse 
the evolution of the sum of gross external position, i.e., the sum of foreign assets and 
liabilities, as a ratio to GDP8 as an indicator of international financial integration. We 
draw on the database constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Their data set has 
the advantage of being able to account for valuation effects and correcting for cross-
country differences in data definitions and variable construction. It covers 145 countries 
over the period 1970-2004.  
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the cross-country average9 of this indicator over the 
period from 1995 to 2004 in the ten CEE countries, the Euro area10 and the group of 
                                                 
7 Some of these provisions are prudential measures and their aim is not necessarily to control capital 
flows.  
8 Stock-based measures are less affected by short-term economic fluctuations (see IMF, 2007; Kose, et. 
al, 2006).  
9 Unweighted cross-country averages. 
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Emerging Asian economies.11 Over the entire period, international financial integration 
was lower in the ten CEE countries than in the Euro area and the group of Emerging 
Asia countries. While it was higher for the group of gradual liberalizers early on, the 
countries that have liberalized their capital accounts fast experienced a stronger 
financial integration since 2000.  
Figure 8: International Financial Integration of the CEE countries, Euro Area, 
 and Emerging Asia, 1995-2004  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dataset from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  
 
Table 1 shows the gross and net foreign asset positions in 1995 and 2004 in the ten CEE 
countries. We also present the averages for the Euro area and Emerging Asia.    
                                                                                                                                               
10 The Euro area includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain. Ireland and Luxembourg are not included as they are extreme outliers due to their 
positions as major offshore centers. 
11 People’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam.  
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Table 1: External Position of the CEE Countries, Euro Area and Emerging Asia  
 External, 1995 External Assets, 2004  
  Gross Net  Gross Net   
       
Czech Republic 100.1 3.6  162.6 -34.6  
Estonia 69.9 -6.8  251.5 -99.7  
Latvia 75.7 -3.3  190.1 -55.0  
Lithuania 48.6 -9.4  105.0 -38.9  
Bulgaria 125.2 -40.6  173.3 -47.8  
Hungary 123.7 -57.7  181.0 -96.9  
Poland 65.7 -21.7  116.6 -53.3  
Romania 41.5 0.7  95.8 -34.8  
Slovak Republic 93.4 12.6  156.5 -37.5  
Slovenia 66.9 2.3  150.8 -18.0  
       
CEEcs 81.1 -12.0  158.3 -51.7  
CEE-Fast group 73.6 -4.0  177.3 -57.1  
CEE-Gradual group 86.0 -17.4  145.7 -48.0  
Euro area 173.5 -11.2  432.9 -20.1  
Emerging Asia  124.9 -29.1  220.5 -3.8  
         
Source: Calculations based on the database constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The gross 
external position is the sum of foreign assets and liabilities as percent of GDP. The net external position is 
the difference between foreign assets and liabilities as percent of GDP.  
   
Over the period from 1995 to 2004, the gross external position of the CEE countries 
increased from an average of 81.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to 158.3 per cent of GDP in 
2004. This increase is larger than the corresponding figure for Emerging Asia, where 
the gross external position rose from an average of 124.9 percent of GDP to 220.5 
percent of GDP. However, it is lower than the corresponding increase in foreign assets 
in the Euro area countries.  
Over the whole period, the group of fast liberalizers experienced faster growth in gross 
external position relative to GDP than the group of gradual liberalizers. In 2004, the 
gross external position was above the CEE average for Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, while the lowest levels were for Romania, Lithuania 
and Poland. The increase of international financial integration during the period from 
1995 to 2004 was greatest for Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia and Lithuania.  
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What explains these cross-country differences in international financial integration? 
Empirical studies 12  suggest a number of factors underlying cross-country financial 
openness, including financial development, institutional quality, trade openness and 
capital controls. Figure A1 (Appendix) shows partial correlations between the gross 
stock of foreign assets and liabilities as percent of GDP and several underlying factors 
suggested by the empirical literature. The data cover the ten CEE countries over the 
period from 1995 to 2004. Although the information in these simple correlations is 
limited, the results are suggestive. They indicate that financial integration is positively 
associated with domestic financial development (measured as private credit as percent 
of GDP and stock market capitalisation as percent of GDP), institutional quality and 
trade openness and negatively associated with capital controls. These results should 
only be taken as indicative as they reflect unconditional partial correlations. A more 
formal analysis is required to identify causal relationships between these underlying 
factors and financial openness. 
Over the period from 1995 to 2004, the ten CEE countries experienced large net capital 
inflows and, as a consequence, dramatic changes in their net external positions. As 
shown in Figure 9, net capital flows into the CEE countries as a percentage of GDP 
were significantly larger than in Euro area and the Emerging Asia. Since 2000, the 
group of fast liberalizers has experienced larger net capital inflows than the gradual 
liberalizers. This is in contrast to the improving net external positions of Emerging Asia 
and the Euro area.  
                                                 
12 For surveys of the recent literature, see for example Kose et al. (2006), IMF (2007a). 
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Figure 9: Net External Positions 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dataset from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  
 
Figure A2 in the Appendix shows the evolution of the composition of gross stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities in the CEE countries over the 1995-2004 period. A 
common feature is the high share of portfolio debt in foreign assets and liabilities. This 
reflects the dominant role of the banking sector in financial intermediation and the large 
size of government securities markets in the CEE countries13. 
 Table 2 shows the composition of the stocks of external liabilities in the CEE countries 
in 1995 and 2004. The low share of portfolio equity in capital inflows in 1995 reflects 
the low level of capital market development and poor corporate governance in these 
countries. Only the Czech and Slovak Republic stand out for larger shares of equity in 
total foreign liabilities. This may be explained by the relative strength of the enterprise 
sector in these countries and their historical economic and trade links to Germany and 
Austria. Another factor may have been that the privatization of the industrial sector in 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of the composition of capital flows to CEE countries, see also (Arvai, 2005) and Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).  
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these two countries was implemented by giving citizens shares in domestic companies. 
Note that the Czech Republic is the largest portfolio investor in the Slovak Republic.14    
With the exception of Latvia, the share of FDI in total liabilities has increased, while 
that of external debt has decreased in all countries. Compared to the gradual liberalizers, 
the group of fast liberalizers has a large share of FDI and a small share of debt in total 
foreign liabilities.  
Excessive reliance on debt for financing current account deficits is commonly regarded 
as a sign of vulnerability to financial shocks, while FDI-based financing is perceived as 
promoting risk-sharing (see Kose et al, 2006; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006). From this 
point of view, the changes in the composition of gross stocks of foreign liabilities in the 
CEE countries over the past decade seem positive.  
Table 2: Composition of Stocks of External Liabilities in the CEE Countries  
  1995   2004  
  
Equity 
% 
FDI 
% 
Debt 
% 
Equity 
% 
FDI 
% 
Debt 
% 
       
Czech Republic 9.7 27.0 63.2 8.9 53.5 36.3 
Estonia 0.0 46.8 53.2 9.7 50.1 40.1 
Latvia 0.4 31.9 67.8 0.9 27.3 71.6 
Lithuania 0.7 19.7 79.6 1.1 40.0 58.9 
Bulgaria 0.4 4.1 95.5 0.1 36.6 63.3 
Hungary 0.5 29.3 70.2 8.6 44.7 44.8 
Poland 1.1 13.2 85.7 6.4 41.6 52.0 
Romania 0.0 5.8 94.2 3.0 39.8 57.2 
Slovak Republic 7.1 16.6 76.3 9.4 38.5 52.1 
Slovenia 1.0 27.6 71.4 2.9 27.3 69.7 
       
CEE-Fast group  2.7 31.4 66.0 5.1 42.7 51.7 
CEE-Gradual group  1.7 16.1 82.2 5.1 38.1 56.5 
              
Source: Based on the dataset from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
 
Table 3 reports the composition of the foreign assets of CEE countries in 1995 and 
2004. Foreign exchange reserves and portfolio debt dominate the composition of 
                                                 
14 See Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007).  
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external assets in these countries. Following the liberalisation of capital outflows and 
increase in cross-border assets trade, the shares of FDI and portfolio equity have surged, 
in particular in Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. To the extent that 
the private sector in the CEE counties becomes more internationalised, it is likely that 
the FDI and portfolio equity outflows will further increase.   
 
Table 3: Composition of Stocks of Foreign Assets in the CEE Countries 
 
  1995   2004  
 
Equity+FDI Debt  Reserves Equity+FDI Debt  Reserves 
% % % % % % 
       
Czech Republic 3.6 49.1 47.4 9.3 47.0 41.3 
Estonia 6.8 44.3 48.9 21.5 57.6 20.6 
Latvia 14.3 57.2 28.6 3.2 75.5 20.7 
Lithuania 0.4 37.2 62.4 6.3 45.8 47.9 
Bulgaria 2.0 75.7 22.3 -0.2 41.3 58.8 
Hungary 1.0 17.7 81.2 15.9 40.1 38.1 
Poland 1.8 48.7 49.5 4.8 49.1 46.1 
Romania 1.7 77.2 21.1 1.4 31.4 67.3 
Slovak Republic 9.5 57.7 32.8 8.9 32.1 59.0 
Slovenia 7.5 66.0 26.6 17.1 42.5 40.4 
       
CEE-Fast group  6.3 47.0 46.8 10.1 56.5 32.6 
CEE-Gradual group  4.0 57.2 38.9 8.0 39.4 51.6 
              
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dataset from Lane and Milesi - Ferretti (2006). 
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 4. CAPITAL FLOWS: PATTERNS AND DETERMINANTS     
As shown in the previous section, net capital flows to the CEE countries have been on a 
rising trend since the early 1990s. Unlike that in other regions (Asia and Latin America) 
the surge in capital flows in these countries has been associated with large current 
account deficits. Tables 4A and 4B report the average deficits in relation to GDP in the 
years 2000-2003 and 2004-2006. Estonia and Latvia stand out with deficits exceeding 
eight percent of GDP, Lithuania and Hungary follow with deficits of 5.6 percent of 
GDP and the Czech Republic with 5.1 percent. While the Czech Republic’s current 
account deficit has not been supported by high real GDP growth rates in recent years, it 
has been accompanied by a high investment rate. Only Slovenia, the first country in this 
group to join the Euro area, has kept its current account close to balance on average in 
recent years. Most new member states experienced sizeable real appreciations15 of their 
currencies in recent years (see Figure 10). Thus, their large current account deficits are 
not an indication of weak currencies; instead, they reflect the large capital inflows these 
countries have attracted in recent years. 
Table 4A: External Performance 2000-2003  
Country Current 
Account 
Balance 
Capital 
Inflows 
Direct 
Investment 
Portfolio 
Investment 
Gross 
Foreign 
Debt 
Foreign 
Debt/ 
Exports 
Bulgaria -4.7 10.6 7.6 2.3 95.9 1.77 
Czech R. -5.1 9.9 8.9 -0.8 82.9 1.32 
Estonia -8.8 9.9 5.4 1.4 111.4 1.48 
Hungary -5.6 5.6 2.2 2.6 113.3 1.71 
Latvia -8.4 9.6 3.8 -1.9 92.3 2.22 
Lithuania -5.6 7.9 3.2 1.5 63.3 1.27 
Poland -3.9 4.1 4.4 1.3 62.0 2.14 
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Slovak R. -3.4 8.0 10.0 4.0 78.8 1.08 
Slovenia -0.4 7.9 4.3 0.1 64.4 1.14 
 
Notes: All entries are averages of annual rates in percent of GDP. Capital inflows include errors and 
omissions. Investment figures are net. Czech Republic and Poland: 2000-2002, Slovak Republic: 2000.  
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
                                                 
15 Von Hagen and Traistaru-Siedschlag (2006) discuss in detail the extent and causes of real currency 
appreciation in the new EU member states.   
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Following their entry into the EU in 2004, the experience of these countries has been 
diverse. Those countries that followed hard exchange rate pegs, namely Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, saw a widening of their current account deficits, while 
those adopting floats, namely the Czech Republic and Poland in particular, kept their 
current account deficits at smaller rates of GDP. Capital inflows rose in the former and 
fell in the latter. Slovenia, which adopted an intermediate peg, had the smallest capital 
inflows during that period.  
 
Table 4B: External Performance 2004-2006  
Country Current 
Account 
Balance 
Capital 
Inflows 
Direct 
Investment 
Portfolio 
Investment 
Gross 
Foreign 
Debt 
Foreign 
Debt/ 
Exports 
Bulgaria -11.5 19.5 14.3 1.2 103.9 1.71 
Czech R. -3.3 4.5 6.0 1.9 94.5 1.30 
Estonia -12.4 14.0 13.1 -0.5 175.8 2.27 
Hungary -7.2 9.1 9.9 6.7 155.0 2.22 
Latvia -15.9 20.1 5.8 1.4 129.5 2.86 
Lithuania -8.5 9.7 4.5 2.3 81.5 1.43 
Poland -3.0 3.8 4.7 3.2 79.2 2.06 
Romania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Slovak R. n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a. n.a. 
Slovenia -2.5 1.4 1.9 0.9 79.1 1.24 
 
Notes: All entries are averages of annual rates in percent of GDP. Capital inflows include errors and 
omissions. Investment figures are net.  
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
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The sustainability of persistent, large current account deficits depends in part on the 
type of capital inflows used to finance these deficits, as portfolio investment is 
commonly thought to be more fickle than direct investment.16 A high share of direct 
investment, therefore, results in less exposure to sudden reversals of capital flows that 
might occur due to changing expectations and investor confidence in the international 
capital market.17 Table 4A shows that there are some striking differences in the type of 
financing among the new member states. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, net foreign direct investment substantially exceeded the 
current account deficits. The other states, in contrast, took recourse to portfolio and 
other investment to a much larger extent. It is interesting to note that Estonia and 
Lithuania, two countries in this group that operate currency boards, have relatively low 
shares of foreign direct investment in financing their current account deficits. This 
                                                 
16 As pointed out by Buiter and Grafe (2002), even foreign direct investment can be quickly reversed if 
there are well developed markets for equity and corporate securities.  
17  Note, however, that even foreign direct investment inflows could be reversed quickly, if foreign 
investors could sell their assets in liquid domestic securities or equities markets. (Buiter and Grafe, 2003).  
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suggests that the credibility of a hard peg is not the principal factor in determining the 
financing conditions.  
Following their entry into the EU in 2004, Estonia and Hungary joined the group of 
countries with FDI exceeding the current account deficit. Tables 4A and 4B show that, 
with the exception of Latvia and Lithuania, the share of direct investment in total capital 
inflows rose following accession to the EU. This suggests that the firm commitment 
institutional framework of European integration and the assured access of their export 
industries to West European markets provided a boost of credibility to the countries’ 
market-oriented policies, persuading international investors to make more long-term 
oriented investments. 
Tables 4A and 4B also show the average gross foreign debt positions of the same 
countries over the same time periods, measured in terms of GDP. External debt ratios 
have increased substantially since the countries’ entry into the EU. Relating foreign debt 
to the annual volume of exports shows that Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland now 
have a relatively large foreign debt burden.  
The prospect of further large capital inflows will be an important factor shaping the 
macroeconomic policies of the new member states in the years to come. As noted by 
Lipschitz et al. (2002) and Lipschitz (2004), the CEE countries in particular are rich in 
well-trained labor and poor in capital compared to their main trading partners, implying 
that their marginal product of capital is relatively high. Table 5 reports some “back-of-
the-envelope” estimates of the marginal product of capital relative to Germany in the 
new member states. Following Lipschitz et al. (2002), they are based on the assumption 
of Cobb-Douglas production functions with a capital elasticity of 1/3 and equal total 
factor productivities in all countries.18 In 1996, the largest relative marginal products of 
capital estimated in this way were in the Baltic countries, followed by Poland. In 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, the marginal products of capital were about 4-5 times 
                                                 
18 Let yi = Ai (ki)α be output per employed worker in country i, with ki the capital labor ratio, Ai total 
factor productivity, and α = 1/3 the capital elasticity. The marginal product of capital is MPCi= αAi(ki)-(1-
α). The capital labor ratios are computed using output in PPP dollars from the World Economic Outlook 
2004 database and labor force and unemployment data from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
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larger than in Germany, and in Slovenia and Cyprus about three times. Since the mid-
1990s, these ratios have declined dramatically, reflecting the rapid productivity growth. 
 
Table 5: Marginal Product of Capital (Multiple of German MPC) 
 BU CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
1996 n.a. 4.17 10.35 4.87 16.36 9.95 8.07 n.a. 6.08 2.87 
2002 10.9 4.08 6.03 3.88 9.80 6.74 5.48 16.0 4.33 2.15 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
EU membership and the adoption of the acquis communautaire represent a dramatic 
improvement in the institutional framework of these economies, which, in 
macroeconomic terms, can be interpreted as a rise in total factor productivity adding to 
the gap in the marginal products of capital in favour of the new member states. 19 
Furthermore, EU membership implies a higher degree of legal certainty for investors, 
and thus induces a reduction in country-risk premiums. Based on these considerations, 
Lipschitz estimates the cumulated potential future capital inflows to be between 65 
percent (Slovenia) and 596 percent of GDP (Lithuania.)20 Obviously, these estimates 
must be taken cautiously given the uncertainty of the model and potential limits of 
capital supply.21 Furthermore, the inflows will be distributed over time. The main point, 
however, is that the capital inflows are likely to remain large in the foreseeable future. 
Other factors contribute to this tendency (Begg et al., 2003). One is the relatively low 
level of financial development of the former socialist economies, which limits the extent 
to which capital investments are financed from domestic sources. Another is the likely 
increase in the demand for money as inflationary expectations continue to fall. Given 
the limited size of domestic securities markets, much of that increase will likely be 
accommodated by an inflow of foreign reserves at the central bank. Finally, Ahearne et 
al (2007) show that capital flows within the Euro area have responded much more 
                                                 
19 IMF (2003) presents empirical evidence that institutional quality affects economic growth. Studying 
growth patterns in transition economies, Grogan and Moers (2001) find that institutional improvements 
lead to higher growth and stronger foreign direct investment. Alfaro et al (2003) find that, in a sample of 
50 countries, institutional weakness is an important hindrance against capital inflows to poor countries.  
20 Lipschitz does not give estimates for Cyprus and Malta. 
21 Jonas (2004) notes that global capital flows to emerging market economies surged in 2003, but predicts 
that they will be reduced in the coming years.  
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strongly to differences in per-capita incomes or output-labor ratios than capital flows 
among European countries outside of the Euro area. This suggests that capital flows to 
the CEE countries will surge again upon their adoption of the euro.   
 
5. MANAGEMENT OF LARGE CAPITAL INFLOWS:  
POLICY CHALLENGES 
Large capital inflows are desirable in principle for relatively low-income countries, 
because they induce an efficient international allocation of capital and expand the 
receiving countries’ consumption and investment frontiers, allowing simultaneously for 
more investment and higher consumption levels, and speeding up the growth and real 
convergence process. However, they also pose potential risks from two sides: 
overheating and volatility.  
The first risk is that of the (in)famous convergence play, a combination of real 
appreciation and declining long-term interest rates due to falling inflationary 
expectations and country-risk premiums, which makes the economies even more 
attractive for short-term capital inflows and portfolio investment. If the demand 
financed by capital inflows falls entirely on tradables, it can simply be absorbed by 
large trade deficits. As witnessed by the experiences of Italy, Spain, and Portugal in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, convergence play in practice fuels domestic demand for 
non-tradables, too, where domestic supply is limited, leading to severe economic 
overheating with inflationary pressures. With a fixed exchange rate, the increase in the 
price level leads to a real appreciation of the domestic currency. With a floating rate, the 
central bank can do more to suppress inflationary pressures and allow the nominal 
exchange rate to appreciate.  
These conventional demand effects may be augmented by financial market or balance 
sheet effects (see Calvo 2002, 2003, Calvo et al. 1999, 2004), in what Calvo and 
Reinhart (1999) call the Fisherian channel of the transmission of capital inflows. The 
real appreciation of the home currency induces a rise in the relative price of non-
tradables. The more it rises, the more the central bank tries to stabilize the nominal 
exchange rate. As a result, producers of non-tradables face a lower ex-post real interest 
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rate and rising cash flows that raise the value of assets that can be collateralized against 
bank loans. Large capital inflows are, therefore, often connected to asset and real estate 
price bubbles fuelling credit booms. To the extent that they are absorbed by an 
expansion of international reserves at the central bank, the ensuing monetary expansion 
contributes to this development.  
We can assess this risk by looking at recent growth rates of narrow money and credit in 
the new member states (Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Annual Average Real Money and Credit Growth, 1999-2006  
 Real Money Growth Less 
Real Output Growth 
Real Domestic Credit Growth 
Less Real Output Growth 
 1999-2003 2004-2006 1999-2003 2004-2006 
Bulgaria 8.9 17.5 n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic  6.4 3.4 -1.1 -0.1 
Estonia 14.0 11.1 18.5 19.2 
Hungary 10.2 5.3 7.2 6.7 
Latvia 13.2 15.9 28.0 30.9 
Lithuania 11.3 20.1 12.2 32.3 
Poland 6.7 6.4 6.3 -5.0 
Romania -0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Slovak Republic 7.3 3.6 -1.2 4.8 
Slovenia 12.5 9.1 13.5 15.9 
  
Notes: Average annual growth rates of narrow money and domestic credit.  
 Source: Based on IMF, International Financial Statistics.  
 
The table shows the average growth rates of narrow real money and real domestic credit 
between 1999 and 2003 and between 2004 and 2006. To put them in perspective, the 
average growth rates of real GDP over the same period are subtracted. Two groups 
emerge in this table: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak 
Republic, which had growth rates of real money exceeding real GDP growth by 0-9 
percent in the years prior to EU accession, and Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Slovenia, where this difference exceeded 10 percent. Following accession, real money 
growth rose strongly in Bulgaria and Lithuania, but stabilized somewhat in Hungary and 
Slovenia.  
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Falling interest rates and declining inflationary expectations may have caused a decline 
in the equilibrium velocity of money. If the income elasticity of the demand for money 
exceeds 1, strong real GDP growth adds another explanation. Thus, real money growth 
rates of 6-8 percent above real output growth may not be excessive. However, the strong 
monetary expansions in the second group raise a red flag. Turning to credit growth, the 
ongoing process of financial market development leads to the expectation that credit is 
growing fast in the new member states. Nevertheless, the table shows four countries 
with clear signs of strong credit booms, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. 
Taking money and credit growth rates together, they seem to be the critical cases in the 
group. This is interesting because, in the past, these four countries also put the largest 
weight on stabilizing their exchange rates among the countries in this group (von Hagen 
and Zhou, 2004; Thimann et al. 2004).  
Table 8:  Volatility of Capital Inflows  
BU Czech 
Republic 
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lith. Poland Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia 
8.2 4.6 3.6 5.0 5.6 3.0 2.8 2.6 4.4 
0.6 0.7 0.3 -1.5 -5.4 -2.0 -1.4 -1.5 0.9 
-12.1 
(1996) 
-11.2 
(1997) 
-6.5 
(1997) 
-19.9 
(1996) 
-5.8 
(2002) 
-6.1 
(1999) 
-3.8 
(2001) 
-2.3 
(1997) 
-9.9 
(2003) 
 
Notes: Standard deviations for Poland and Czech Republic: 1994-2002, for Slovak Republic: 1994-2000. 
All entries are in percent of GDP. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on International Financial Statistics. 
 
To prevent the large capital inflows from excessively fuelling domestic demand, many 
central banks, especially those with exchange rate pegs, have tried to sterilize them, 
with the result of a sharp rise in foreign assets held by the central bank; see Figure 11. 
This sterilization, however, can be costly, as the foreign assets purchased by the central 
bank typically have interest rates below domestic-currency denominated assets. The 
resulting interest payments can become sizeable burdens on the central government 
budget, and are dubbed “quasi-fiscal costs” of sterilization. For example, central bank 
losses from sterilizing operations amounted to 2.3 percent of GDP for the Slovak 
Republic in 2002, and a similar loss was expected for 2003 (OECD, 2004); in Hungary, 
the central government paid the equivalent of 1.3 percent of GDP to the central bank in 
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2002 to cover losses from sterilization (MNB, Annual Report 2002). The BIS estimates 
that the annual costs of sterilizing intervention in individual years between 2000 and 
2003 amounted to up to 0.15 percent of GDP for the Czech Republic, 0.2 percent for 
Poland, and 0.74 percent for Hungary (Mohanty and Turner, 2005). Hauner (2005) 
points out that the quasi-fiscal costs of holding large amounts of international reserves 
should include the opportunity foregone to pay down foreign debt or to finance public 
investment. He estimates the costs of sterilizing capital inflows at 0.5-0.6 percent of 
GDP annually for the CEE countries. Thus, the costs of managing capital inflows can be 
substantial.  
 
Source: IMF, IFS Statistics January 2007. 
 
Figure 11 shows the development of central bank net foreign assets relative to reserve 
money. For Slovenia, we use currency in circulation multiplied by a factor of 10 to 
obtain a similar order of magnitude. On the left-hand axis, we show the ratio for the 
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countries that pegged their exchange rates, while for the floating-rate countries (Czech 
Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic), we use the right-hand axis. For the 
first group, the ratio of net foreign reserves to reserve money was stable or slightly 
increasing over the 11 years under consideration, indicating that central bank money 
growth was primarily driven by foreign-exchange policies. Remarkably, for the 
floating-rate countries, we observe a rising trend in the ratio, indicating that they 
purchased foreign assets on large scales, presumably to keep their currencies from 
appreciating faster. Thus, the large capital inflows fuelled monetary expansions even in 
countries that did not officially peg their exchange rates.  
The second risk connected with large capital inflows is their volatility. To date, in fact, 
capital inflows to the new member states have been quite volatile. Table 8 reports the 
standard deviation of annual capital inflows relative to GDP between 1994 and 2003. 
This ratio varied between 2.6 percent of GDP for Poland and 5.0 percent of GDP for 
Hungary. Volatility is high compared to the average inflows reported in Table 4. The 
table also shows that several countries in this group experienced large reversals of 
capital inflows, Sudden stops in the term used by Calvo and Reinhart (1999). Between 
1999 and 2000, capital inflows slowed down in seven of the ten countries, the 
exceptions being the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia. Between 1994 and 2003, 
eight of the ten countries experienced at least one year in which capital inflows declined 
by more than five percent of GDP, while four experienced a decline of (almost) 10 
percent or more. This confirms the observation by Calvo and Reinhart (1999) that large 
capital inflows are often followed by sudden stops and reversals. With the exception of 
Poland and the Slovak Republic, the reversals reported in Table 8 easily qualify as large 
compared to the evidence reported by Calvo and Reinhart. Obviously, they have 
affected countries with very different exchange rate regimes, supporting Calvo’s (2003) 
argument that exchange rate policies are of secondary importance for the incidence of 
sudden stops. Note also that the largest reversals occurred around the year 2000, 
confirming the observation in Calvo and Reinhart (1999) and Calvo et al. (2004) that 
sudden stops are bunched in time and across countries.  
Sudden stops create macroeconomic problems through the same channels discussed 
above in reverse (Calvo and Reinhart, 1999). A sudden stop requires a contraction of 
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the current account deficit or the money supply or both, leading to a contraction in 
aggregate demand. The ensuing real depreciation of the currency entails a drop in the 
relative price of non-tradables. Producers of non-tradables now face higher ex-post real 
interest rates and lower asset values anticipated, including those assets they can use as 
collateral for borrowing from banks. Banks react to the resulting deterioration in the 
quality of their loans by cutting back lending. The resulting credit crunch makes the 
recession more pronounced and longer lasting. In principle, this financial effect can be 
avoided by a large nominal depreciation of the currency. This, however, increases the 
burden of foreign currency debt on the government and the private sector.    
Coping with large capital inflows is a difficult task for macroeconomic policy. Since the 
underlying reason is real, there is not much that monetary policy can do. The obvious 
response is to tighten monetary policy to prevent aggregate demand from overheating. 
With a fixed exchange rate, capital inflows then lead to a rapid increase in international 
reserves. The central bank may try to sterilize their impact on the money supply, but in 
practice this is costly and ultimately of only limited success. Inflationary pressures then 
result in a real appreciation, a loss in international competitiveness, and a widening 
current account deficit. Under a flexible exchange rate, the central bank may be more 
successful in keeping inflation low, but at the cost of a nominal appreciation of the 
currency, with the same effect on competitiveness and the current account. 
At the same time, episodes of large capital inflows into small open economies generate 
a preference for low exchange rate variability, even if the official exchange rate regime 
allows for a high degree of flexibility. This has been dubbed the fear of floating in 
recent literature. The reason is that, since emerging-market countries typically cannot 
borrow internationally in their own currency, large capital inflows lead to a mounting 
stock of foreign debt denominated in foreign currency. Exchange rate variations then 
expose the government and private sector to fluctuations in their balance sheets. 
Hausmann et al. (2001) show that fear of floating is strongly associated with a country’s 
borrowing in foreign currency and the degree of exchange rate volatility it allows.22 If 
this is true for the new EU member states, they will show a tendency to tightly manage 
                                                 
22 A recent paper by Detken and Gaspar (2004) shows that fear of floating could also stem from the 
combination of inflation targeting and a specific monetary-policy rule in a neo-Keynesian model. 
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their exchange rates as the capital inflows continue to persist. Today already, five of the 
CEE countries have adopted intermediate or hard pegs and Slovenia has joined the Euro 
area; see Table 9. They may even decide to enter the ERM-2 for that reason, hoping that 
it will offer more credibility to their commitment to exchange rate targets.23 Yet, the 
comfort offered by an exchange rate peg in this situation can be quite betraying. As the 
risk of exchange rate variability seems to be low, private borrowers and the government 
are more inclined to borrow in foreign currencies than they would be otherwise, which 
increases the exposure to sudden stops and exchange rate crises. As long as the capital 
inflows continue to be large, the exchange rate peg brings a monetary and credit 
expansion that aggravates the tendency for overheating. Once the capital flows dry up, 
the peg may come under speculative attacks, which, unless they can be successfully 
defended, are costly and more disruptive than the adjustment under a floating rate.  
 
Table 9: Exchange Rate Regimes of CEE Countries 
Country Regime Country Regime 
Bulgaria Currency board Lithuania Currency board 
Czech Republic Float Poland Float 
Estonia Currency board Romania Float 
Hungary Intermediate peg Slovak Republic Float 
Latvia Intermediate Peg Slovenia Euro 
Source: World Bank (2006), von Hagen and Zhou (2004). 
The ERM-2 may offer some relief and credibility in such a situation due to the financial 
support for interventions it provides, but the history of the early 1990s suggests that its 
usefulness is limited at best. The experience teaches that European exchange rates tend 
to become objects of politics, especially in situations where there is market tension. The 
                                                 
23 The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-2) is the official framework of the ECB within which EU 
countries can choose to peg their currencies to the euro. It stipulates a central parity which can be adjusted 
by agreement between the ECB and the respective country, and bands of +/- 2.25 percent. Importantly, it 
does not stipulate a requirement for the ECB to intervene in support of a participating currency. Countries 
that wish to join the Euro area are required to participate in the ERM-2 for at least two years without 
devaluing their currencies on their own initiative.  
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countries exposed to convergence play failed to adjust their exchange rates in a timely 
way in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and this contributed to the size of the later 
devaluations and currency crises. When Germany asked for a revaluation of the DM to 
absorb the post-unification capital inflows, other governments and central banks were 
unwilling to grant it. It is not clear a priori that the new member states would not see 
similar resistance against repeated devaluations of the euro against their currencies, 
which might be required to counteract inflationary tendencies if capital inflows continue 
during their ERM-2 membership. Thus, the multilateral nature of the ERM-2 does not 
obviously add to its economic rationality. It is equally uncertain that the multilateral 
political negotiations required for devaluations can be completed fast enough in the case 
of a sudden stop. The multilateral political framework may, in contrast, create 
ambiguities and rumours in the markets, which can undermine the credibility of the 
pegs. 
Since a sudden stop of capital inflows is equivalent to a cut in international credit to the 
home economy, the appropriate response by the central bank is to expand credit to the 
private sector. This can be done through open market operations or loans to the banking 
system under a flexible exchange rate and entail a nominal depreciation of the currency. 
The latter also reduces the need for the relative price of non-tradables to fall, but 
increases the domestic value of the foreign debt burden on the government and the 
private sector to the extent that foreign debt is denominated in foreign currency. 
Maintaining an exchange rate peg, in contrast, allows one to avoid the valuation effect, 
but the loss of international reserves at the central bank leads to a monetary contraction 
that makes the credit crunch more severe. Thus, sudden stops create a monetary policy 
dilemma. As recent literature has noted, euro-ization offers a partial way out of this 
dilemma. 24  First, it eliminates the valuation effect on the affected country’s debt 
denominated in euros. Second, the supply of bank credit is no longer limited by the 
domestic central bank’s supply of bank reserves but by the ESCB’s supply of bank 
reserves. This makes any the credit contraction less severe, as monetary policy will not 
add to it. As a result, countries facing large (and volatile) capital inflows should have a 
                                                 
24 See Begg et al. (2003) and the literature discussed there. 
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preference for either floating exchange rates or euro-ization, but avoid soft pegs, 
especially if, as in the case of the ERM-2, they are unprotected by capital controls. 
Fiscal policy is the more appropriate policy instrument for dealing with capital flows. In 
the face of large inflows, tightening the fiscal stance helps reduce the risk of economic 
overheating. Here, again, the quality of the fiscal adjustment matters. If tightening is 
achieved by raising tax rates, the result is buoyant tax revenues and, therefore, a strong 
temptation to expand fiscal spending. At the same time, initiatives to cut spending in the 
face of a strong economy will not be very popular. Furthermore, Calvo (2003) points 
out that, by raising distortionary taxes, the government may reduce the economy’s 
growth potential and thus precipitate a sudden stop. Again, it is important to achieve 
tightening by cutting government expenditures rather than by raising taxes. This makes 
the role of good budgeting institutions especially important. Effective spending controls 
and medium-term fiscal targets that are well anchored in the planning and 
implementation procedures are important for achieving a sufficient degree of fiscal 
discipline and using fiscal policy to manage capital inflows.25  
 As most of the new member states need to tighten their fiscal policies to meet the 
requirements of EMU, managing capital inflows and meeting these requirements are 
complementary goals for them. However, the countries with the tightest fiscal stance in 
recent years are also those that have experienced the strongest credit expansions. For 
them, as for the others in the future, further tightening to fend off the macroeconomic 
effects of large capital inflows may be asking too much of fiscal policy (Jonas, 2004).  
There is also a task here for prudential supervision and banking regulation involved in 
managing large capital inflows. Recent empirical studies show that large credit booms 
and strong real appreciations are among the best indicators of the risk of currency and 
banking crises.26 Banking regulation can help to prevent capital inflows from spilling 
over into domestic credit booms (Begg et al., 2003.) Strict rules against overlending and 
overexposure to individual borrowers are one important element. As lending booms are 
often triggered by real estate price bubbles, limits on the use of real estate as collateral 
                                                 
25 Kopits (2000) also notes the usefulness of credible medium-term fiscal plans (rules in his terminology) 
to avert currency crises in emerging-market economies. 
26 For banking crises, see Borio et al. (2004) and Ho and von Hagen (2007). For currency crises, see 
Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1999).  
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can serve as another element for protecting the banking system against adverse 
developments. Furthermore, currency mismatch in the aggregate balance sheet of the 
banking sector has been an important part of the link between banking problems and 
currency crises in recent years. Systemic risk arising from large exposure to 
international interest rate shocks or sudden capital outflows may not be visible in 
individual bank balance sheets even when it is in the aggregate balance sheet. 
Monitoring the entire banking sector’s financial position is, therefore, an important part 
of banking supervision in the new member states.  
One important feature of the financial opening of the CEE countries in this regard has 
been the transformation of banking sectors. At the beginning of this process in the early 
1990s, the banking sectors consisted largely of a few incumbent institutions emerging 
from the socialist mono-bank systems in each country. The exception was the Baltic 
countries. Banking systems were generally quite weak, and they went through a series 
of crises. In the late 1990s, foreign banks were given permission to move into the CEE 
countries and quickly established a presence there. In 2006, foreign-owned banks had 
market shares of at least 50 percent in all the CEE countries, and more than 80 percent 
in Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Estonia (EBRD, 
2006). This added significantly to the stability of the financial sector of these countries, 
as the parent banks have provided liquidity and capital support during banking crises, 
enabling their local subsidiaries to maintain lending when local banks had to cut back 
their own. Furthermore, the presence of foreign banks has added to the quality of 
banking supervision, since, under EU rules, supervisors in the parent banks’ home 
countries are responsible for the consolidated institutions. It is, therefore, likely that the 
presence of foreign banks has strengthened the CEE countries’ ability to cope with the 
macroeconomic challenges posed by large capital inflows. 
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6 LESSONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA’S EMERGING 
ECONOMIES  
Over the past decade, the ten CEE countries have achieved a high degree of market 
integration and macroeconomic stabilization as part of their accession process. Capital 
account opening formed part of the increasing integration of these countries into the 
world economy. EU accession and OECD membership were two important institutional 
anchors for their international financial integration. Although the pace of the capital 
account liberalization varied across the ten countries, three common features can be 
identified in the sequencing of this process: (i) restrictions on FDI were removed before 
financial flows were liberalised; (ii) capital inflows were liberalised before capital 
outflows; and (iii) long-term capital flows were liberalised before short-term flows.  
Over the 1995-2004 period the level of international financial integration in the ten CEE 
countries was low in comparison to the Euro area average and the group of emerging 
Asian countries. While in the beginning of the period, international financial integration 
was higher in the group of gradual liberalizers, since 1998 the countries that have 
rapidly liberalized their capital account have experienced a faster increase in their 
international financial integration than the group of gradual liberalisers. Over the same 
period, the increase of international financial integration in the CEE was high in 
comparison to the group of nine emerging Asian economies but low in comparison to 
the increase in the Euro area. The group of fast capital account liberalizers experienced 
faster growth of their financial openness than the group of gradual liberalizers.  
A common feature of changes in the composition of the gross stocks of assets and 
liabilities has been an increase in the share of FDI and a decrease in the portfolio debt. 
To the extent that FDI-based financing is perceived as promoting risk sharing, this 
change can be seen as positive.  
As a consequence of large capital inflows in recent years, the net external position in the 
ten CEE countries has changed dramatically from the mid 1990s. In 2004, their average 
net external position as a percentage of GDP was significantly larger than the average 
for the Euro area and the group of emerging Asian countries. Since 2000, the group of 
fast liberalizers has experienced larger net capital flows than the gradual liberalizers.  
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In the ten CEE countries, financial openness appears to be positively associated with 
domestic financial development (measured as private credit as percent of GDP and 
stock market capitalisation as percent of GDP), institutional quality and trade openness, 
and to be negatively associated with capital controls.  
While large capital inflows are in principle desirable for relatively low-income 
countries, they also pose the potential risk of sudden stops leading to large economic 
and financial imbalances. Coping with large capital inflows is a difficult task for 
macroeconomic policy. Since the underlying reason is real, there is not much monetary 
policy can do. The obvious response is to tighten monetary policy to prevent aggregate 
demand from overheating. With a fixed exchange rate, inflationary pressures result in a 
real appreciation, a loss in international competitiveness, and a widening current 
account deficit. With a flexible exchange rate, the central bank may be more successful 
in keeping inflation low, but at the cost of a nominal appreciation of the currency, with 
the same effect on competitiveness and the current account. We argue that fiscal policy 
is the more appropriate policy instrument for dealing with large capital inflows. 
Tightening the fiscal stance helps to reduce the risk of economic overheating. We argue 
that more effective spending controls and improved budgeting procedures rather than 
higher taxes will best promote macroeconomic stability.  
There is also a role for prudent banking and financial market supervision in steering 
clear of credit booms and asset price bubbles that make such scenarios more likely, but 
also for reducing the vulnerability of the financial sector and the exposure of the 
government to implicit liabilities that can result from a capital account crisis. 
Governments would be well advised to keep substantial safety markings both with 
regard to deficits and debt to assure that they can respond to a sudden stop with the 
necessary financial rescue of the banking system and a fiscal expansion to partly absorb 
the fall in aggregate demand.  
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Table A1: Managing Capital Flows: The Experience of Central and East European Countries  
   
Country 
Exchange rate regime (de 
facto) 
Pace and sequencing of capital account 
liberalisation 
Episodes of 
large net 
private 
capital 
inflows 
Predominant 
types of capital 
inflows 
Policy responses 
Bulgaria Currency Board since 1997, 
independent floating before 
1997 
 
Gradual. 
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): September 24 1994. 
1992-1993, 
ongoing since 
1997 
FDI, Portfolio debt   
Czech Rep. Fixed exchange rate until 
1997; since 1998 managed 
floating with no 
predetermined path for the 
exchange rate  
Fast. 
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): October 1, 1995. 
 With the exception of some outflows, 
almost all controls removed by 1995. FDI 
liberalized first. 
Inflows liberalised before outflows.  
Outflows by non-residents fully 
liberalised in 2001. Five-year program to 
eliminate controls in outflows in the 
context of accession to OECD 1995-
2001. 
1994-95, 
2000-02 
FDI, Portfolio 
debt, Portfolio 
equity 
Expansionary fiscal policy. Interest rate policy, 
inflation targeting. 
  
Fiscal consolidation remains the biggest challenge to 
Euro adoption 
Estonia Currency Board since 1992 
ERM-2 since 28 June 2004  
Fast.  
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): August 15, 1994. 
Almost all controls removed by 1994. 
Pension funds investments last to be 
1996-98, 
ongoing since 
2005 
FDI, Portfolio 
debt, Portfolio 
equity 
Fiscal policy used to offset effect of capital inflows 
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liberalised 
Latvia Fixed peg to SDR until the 
end of 2004 and to the euro 
since 1 January 2005 
ERM-2 since 2 May 2005 
Fast. 
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): June 10, 1994. 
Real estate and pensions funds' 
investment last to be liberalized. 
1994-95, 
ongoing since 
2005 
FDI, Portfolio debt  Fiscal policy used to offset effect of capital inflows 
Lithuania Currency Board since 1994 
ERM-2 since 2 8 June 2004 
Fast.  
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): May 3, 1994. 
Real estate and pensions funds' 
investment last to be liberalized. 
1997-98, 
ongoing since 
2005 
FDI, Portfolio debt Fiscal policy used to offset effect of capital inflows 
Hungary Pegged exchange rate with 
horizontal bands since 1995 
 
Gradual.  
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): January 1, 1996. 
FDI liberalised first. Long-term flows 
liberated before short term flows. OECD 
1991-2000, 
2005 
FDI, Portfolio 
bond (sovereign), 
Bank lending 
(short term) 
Macroeconomic stabilisation following 1995 crisis. 
  
Loose fiscal policy meant burden of disinflation 
placed on tight monetary policy. 
 
Fiscal consolidation remains the biggest challenge to 
Euro adoption 
Poland Independently floating from 
2000; crawling floating 
previously to this. 
Gradual.  
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): June 1, 1995. 
Long-term flows liberalised before short-
term flows; inflows before outflows; FDI 
and portfolio before financial credits. 
Liberalisation sped up during OECD 
accession negotiations. 
1995-2000 FDI, Portfolio 
bond, Portfolio 
equity, Bank 
lending 
Loose fiscal policy meant burden of managing 
disinflation placed on tight monetary policy. 
Fiscal consolidation remains the biggest challenge to 
Euro adoption 
Romania Managed floating with no 
predetermined path for the 
exchange rate since 1991 
Gradual. 
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): March 25, 1998. 
1990-93, 
1996-98, 
ongoing since 
2004 
FDI, Portfolio debt   
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Slovak Rep Fixed exchange rate until 
1998; pegged exchange rate 
within horizontal bands  
ERM-2 since 28 November 
2005 
Gradual.  
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): October 1, 1995. 
Long-term flows liberalised before short-
term flows; inflows before outflows; FDI 
and portfolio before financial credits.  
Most restrictions eliminated to meet EU 
requirements. OECD accession was an 
important anchor. 
1996-98, 
2002, 2005 
FDI, Portfolio 
debt, Portfolio 
equity 
Loose fiscal policy lead to large current account 
deficits. 
Fiscal consolidation remains the biggest challenge to 
Euro adoption 
Slovenia Heavily managed float  
Independently floating 
previously  
Joined the Euro are in 2007 
Gradual.  
Current account convertibility  
(IMF, Art VIII): September 1, 1995. 
After having introduced capital controls 
in 1995-99, credit operations liberalised 
first. Long-term flows liberalised before 
short-term flows. Portfolio flows last to 
be liberalised. 
1997, 2001-
02 
FDI, Portfolio debt Fiscal policy used to offset effect of capital inflows 
 
Sources:  
Arvai Zsofia, (2005), Capital Account Liberalisation, Capital Flow Patterns and Policy Responses in the EU’s New Member States, IMF working Paper WP/05/213; 
Freytag, A., (2002) Accession to EMU and exchange rate policies in Central Europe - decision under institutional constraints Bank of Estonia Working Papers No 2002-1; 
International Monetary Fund (2007a), “Reaping the Benefits of Financial Globalization”, IMF Discussion Paper, No. 06/07, Research Department, Washington: International 
Monetary Fund, June 2007;International Monetary Fund, (2007b) “Managing Large Capital Inflows”, World Economic Outlook, October 2007, pp. 1-29;International 
Monetary Fund, (2007c) “The Quality of Domestic Financial Markets and Capital Inflows”, Global Financial Stability Report ,October pp.77-109, Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund; International Moneatry Fund: “De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Framework”, July 2006, 
http://www.imf.org .  
 
Table A2: Regulatory Framework for Capital Transactions, 31 December 2006  
 
  BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
           
Capital transactions           
Controls on:           
Capital market securities  1  1   1  1  
Money market instruments  1  1   1    
Collective investment securities   1  1   1  1 1 
Derivatives and other instruments  1     1    
Commercial credits           
Financial credits  1  1   1    
Guarantees, sureties, financial backup facilities        1    
Direct investment  1  1 1 1 1  1 1 
Liquidation of direct investment         na  
Real estate transactions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Personal capital movements   1  1 1 1    
Provisions specific to:           
Commercial banks and other credit institutions 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Institutional investors 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 na 1 1 
            
 Total restrictions  3 9 4 7 5 5 11 2 6 5 
           
1: the specified practice is a feature of the exchange system           
na: data not available at time of publication           
blank: the specific practice is not regulated            
           
Source: Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2007 IMF, xiv-liv       
Figure A1: Determinants of Financial Integration, CEE Countries  
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Source: Based on the database constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), World Development 
Indicators database, the World Bank, the Fraser Institute database (2007), and Kaufmann et al. (2007).  
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Figure A2:  Composition of Gross Foreign Assets and Liabilities (% of total),  
CEE Countries, 1995-2004 
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Source: Based on the data set constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The 
category “other” includes financial derivatives and total reserves minus gold. 
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Year Number 
Title/Author(s) 
ESRI Authors/Co-authors Italicised 
   
2008 233 ICT Diffusion, Innovation Systems, Globalisation 
and Regional Economic Dynamics: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence 
  Charlie Karlsson, Gunther Maier, Michaela Trippl, 
Iulia Siedschlag, Robert Owen and Gavin Murphy 
   
 232 Welfare and Competition Effects of Electricity 
Interconnection between Great Britain and Ireland 
  Laura Malaguzzi Valeri 
   
 231 Is FDI into China Crowding Out the FDI into the 
European Union? 
  Laura Resmini and Iulia Siedschlag 
   
 230 Estimating the Economic Cost of Disability in 
Ireland 
  John Cullinan, Brenda Gannon and Seán Lyons 
   
 229 Controlling the Cost of Controlling the Climate: The 
Irish Government’s Climate Change Strategy 
Colm McCarthy, Sue Scott 
   
 228 The Impact of Climate Change on the Balanced-
Growth-Equivalent: An Application of FUND 
  David Anthoff, Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 227 Changing Returns to Education During a Boom? 
The Case of Ireland 
  Seamus McGuinness, Frances McGinnity, Philip 
O’Connell 
   
 226 ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Social Risks: Life Cycle and Social 
Class Perspectives on Social Exclusion in Ireland 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 225 The Climate Preferences of Irish Tourists by 
Purpose of Travel 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 224 A Hirsch Measure for the Quality of Research 
Supervision, and an Illustration with Trade 
Economists 
  Frances P. Ruane and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 223 Environmental Accounts for the Republic of 
Ireland: 1990-2005 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 48 
2007 222 Assessing Vulnerability of Selected Sectors under 
Environmental Tax Reform: The issue of pricing 
power 
  J. Fitz Gerald, M. Keeney and S. Scott 
 
   
 221 Climate Policy Versus Development Aid 
Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 220 Exports and Productivity – Comparable Evidence 
for 14 Countries 
The International Study Group on Exports and 
Productivity 
 
 219 Energy-Using Appliances and Energy-Saving 
Features: Determinants of Ownership in Ireland 
Joe O’Doherty, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 218 The Public/Private Mix in Irish Acute Public 
Hospitals: Trends and Implications 
Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley 
   
 217 Regret About the Timing of First Sexual 
Intercourse: The Role of Age and Context 
Richard Layte, Hannah McGee 
   
 216 Determinants of Water Connection Type and 
Ownership of Water-Using Appliances in Ireland 
Joe O’Doherty, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 215 Unemployment – Stage or Stigma?  
Being Unemployed During an Economic Boom 
Emer Smyth 
   
 214 The Value of Lost Load 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 213 Adolescents’ Educational Attainment and School 
Experiences in Contemporary Ireland 
Merike Darmody, Selina McCoy, Emer Smyth 
   
 212 Acting Up or Opting Out? Truancy in Irish 
Secondary Schools 
Merike Darmody, Emer Smyth and Selina McCoy 
   
 211 Where do MNEs Expand Production: Location 
Choices of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe 
after 1992 
Frances P. Ruane, Xiaoheng Zhang 
   
 210 Holiday Destinations: Understanding the Travel 
Choices of Irish Tourists 
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Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 209 The Effectiveness of Competition Policy and the 
Price-Cost Margin: Evidence from Panel Data 
Patrick McCloughan, Seán Lyons and William Batt 
   
 208 Tax Structure and Female Labour Market 
Participation: Evidence from Ireland 
Tim Callan, A. Van Soest, J.R. Walsh 
   
 207 Distributional Effects of Public Education Transfers 
in Seven European Countries 
Tim Callan, Tim Smeeding and Panos Tsakloglou 
 
 
 
